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U.S. Government:
Comparative Lessons for EU’s Next Steps
in Procurement
Christopher Yukins* and Michał Kania**

ABSTRACT
Governments may exclude vendors from procurement awards for many reasons,
including poor performance and corruption. Excluding a vendor, whether from
a particular procurement (deciding that the vendor is not qualified for award) or
from an entire procurement system (suspending or debarring the vendor), calls
for a complex assessment of the performance and reputational risks posed by
that vendor, and of the costs of exclusion. As the EU’s Member States shape their
exclusion systems consistent with the EU’s procurement directives, the Member
States may wish to draw on U.S. strategies for managing risks in contractor qualification: requiring that contractors establish strong internal controls, centralizing
the management of vendor exclusions, and using administrative agreements and
independent monitors which allow agencies to mitigate risks even as they, and
their vendors, avoid the disruption that suspension and debarment may cause.
These U.S. strategies align well with the EU procurement directives, and in many
cases reflect a natural extension of strategies that EU Member States are already
using to address the risks posed by bad or corrupt contractors.
All over the world, public procurement systems seek to maximize efficiency
in public spending. To frame a goal for efficient procurement, the legal regimes
governing public procurement sometimes use the terms best value or value for
money, and there are a number of legal constructs used to further that ambitious
goal. These constructs include, among others, regulations on competition, transparency and integrity, on different solicitation methods, on evaluation criteria
for award, on e-procurement mechanisms and contract administration, and on
complaints or protests about the procurement process. Most importantly for our
purposes here, those constructs generally include qualification requirements for
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vendors – qualification which may be denied when a contractor is excluded from
a particular contract (typically by an individual contracting official), and broader
exclusion (which we will treat here as suspension or debarment) which can bar a
vendor from participating at all in a procurement system. Contractors may be
excluded for any number of reasons, including of course rank corruption.1
This question of qualification and exclusion – of selecting vendors that are
responsible and appropriately prepared to perform, and excluding those that are
not – can be addressed through qualification criteria and, more broadly, through
exclusion criteria which often build on those same qualification criteria. While
the EU’s main procurement directive, Directive 2014/24/EU,2 seems to divide
these two questions of qualification and exclusion, the U.S. government bundles
the two into one concept: an assessment of the responsibility of the vendor. If a
vendor is not responsible, it is not qualified and cannot be awarded a contract;
by the same token, once a vendor is confronted with proof of its prior misconduct, if the vendor cannot show that it is “presently responsible” it generally will
be excluded from federal procurement.3 The term present responsibility refers to
business ethics, integrity, honesty and competence.4 The modifier present plays a
pivotal role in the U.S. federal exclusion regime, because a vendor may show that
notwithstanding past troubling conduct, at present that risk has been mitigated
or eliminated, and that therefore exclusion is unnecessary.5
Various sources of information are used by U.S. government agencies to assess
contractors’ qualifications – including direct inquiries, market surveys, past performance data, and certifications submitted to the government6 -- to ensure that
federal agencies deal only with responsible vendors that are prepared to fulfill their
legal and contractual obligations7. Those firms that do not meet high standards of
responsibility under the primary principles of the U.S. public procurement system
1

2

3

4

5

6
7

See generally Sope Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Analysis of Disqualification or Debarment Measures (Bloomsbury 2012).
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 94 (March
28, 2014), p. 65–242 (hereinafter “Directive 2014/24/EU”).
For a discussion of the history of this concept of “responsibility,” see, e.g., Robert F. Meunier &
Trevor B. A. Nelson, Is It Time for A Single Federal Suspension and Debarment Rule?, 46 Pub. Cont.
L.J. 553, 556 (2017).
FAR 9.103 (b); see also Christopher Yukins, Cristiana Silva & Mariana Avelar, A Comparative View
of Debarment and Suspension of Contractors in Brazil and in the USA (2017), 66 Admin. & Constit.
L. Rev. 61 (2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080396.
See Robert T. Rhoad & David Robbins, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension, in Thomson Reuters’
Government Contracts Year in Review Conference – covering 2018, Conference Briefs 2019, pp.
15-24.
See, e.g., FAR 9.105-1(c).
See Kate M. Manuel, Congressional Research Service, Debarment and Suspension of Government
Contractors: An Overview of the Law Including Recently Enacted and Proposed Amendments (Nov. 19,
2008), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34753.pdf.

48

Suspension and Debarment in the U.S: lessons for EU

are excluded from winning federal contracts, consistent with Steven Schooner’s
observation that bribery, favoritism and unethical behavior have no place in a
successful procurement system.8
The question, then, is whether the U.S. government’s approach to contractor
qualification and exclusion can be integrated successfully into an international
public procurement market. There is political support for closer trade relations
between the United States and the EU, and those closer relations presumably
would include more tightly integrated procurement markets, both between
the United States and the EU and globally.9 With this in mind, both business
exchanges and regulatory cooperation require a sound understanding of the main
legal and economic constructs on both sides of the Atlantic. More specifically,
issues of qualification and exclusion probably will prove central to successful
integration of procurement markets, as qualification and exclusion (if handled
incorrectly) can raise serious barriers to cross-border procurement. Rather than
integrating and converging, however, qualification and exclusion have diverged
in troubling ways in the U.S. and EU regimes.
In this paper, the starting point for our comparative analysis will be the U.S.
government’s Federal Acquisition Regulation,10 most importantly its provisions
regarding exclusion and debarment11. Our main argument builds on a groundbreaking assessment of debarment internationally by Sope Williams-Elegbe,12

8

9

10

11

12

See generally Steven Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law,
(2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Review 103.
See, e.g., Christopher Yukins & Hans-Joachim Prieß, Breaking the Impasse in the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations: Rethinking Priorities in Procurement, 56 Gov. Contr.
1, 3-7 (July 23, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2471653.
There have been serious attempts to foster transatlantic cooperation in the last few years. One result
was the intensive work done on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) from
2010 to 2016. Even though TTIP has been largely suspended during the Trump administration, the
gradual globalization of public procurement markets means that there is an ongoing, and serious,
need for better integration of the two public procurement regimes. For a discussion of the current
levels of cross-border procurement trade between the EU and the United States, see Christopher
R. Yukins, International Procurement Developments in 2018 – Part IV: The United States in International Procurement: Understanding a Pause in the Trump Administration’s Protectionism, 2019 Gov’t
Contracts Year in Rev. Br. 6 (available on Westlaw).
https://www.acquisition.gov/browse/index/far. For a thorough introduction to the U.S. suspension
and debarment regime, see, e.g., John Pachter, Christopher Yukins & Jessica Tillipman, U.S. Debarment: An Introduction (Feb. 24, 2019) (draft chapter for forthcoming volume, Cambridge U. Press
(D. Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij, eds.)), available at http://publicprocurementinternational.
com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-02-24-Draft-Debarment-Compliance-Handbook-ChapterJohn-Pachter-Chris-Yukins-Jessica-Tillipman-1.pdf.
This paper will not make a close review of exclusion and debarment in “nonprocurement” matters
(such as grants by the federal government), or in state and local governments in the US, which have
independent procurement systems.
Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 3.
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a pivotal comparative paper by Sati Harutyunyan,13 and a series of papers and
presentations given at a March 2019 symposium at King’s College, London,14 that
policy makers in the EU may wish to look to some of the solutions for exclusion
and debarment that have developed over many years in the U.S. federal procurement system. Drawing on lessons from the U.S. experience may ease cooperation
in cross-border trade, and may help the EU Member States advance their own
systems for exclusion and debarment, which are being developed under the broad
mandates of the EU’s 2014 procurement directives.15
Sharing lessons across the Atlantic may be easier than it seems, because the
two systems – U.S. and EU – in fact have a great deal in common. Both systems
focus first on effective public spending in procurement (the “value for money”
norm discussed above).16 In both systems, common principles such as competition,
integrity and transparency play key roles.
There are also, though, several basic differences between the two systems.
Unlike the U.S. federal system, which relies heavily on multilateral competitive
negotiations for more complex procurements, Member States in the EU tend
to rely much more heavily on open procedures (most analogous to price-based

13

14

15

16

While this paper argues that elements of the U.S. suspension and debarment model could be accommodated within the structure set by the EU procurement directives, Sati Harutyunyan went a step
further and argued that the directive itself should be reformed to call for debarment systems in the
EU Member States. See Sati Harutyunyan, Risk and Expectation in Exclusion from Public Procurement: Understanding Market Access and Harmonization Between the European Union and the United
States, 45 Pub. Cont. L.J. 449, 476 (2016) (“A debarment structure stipulated in the Directive
. . . may provide a solution to the sufficiency assessment in the EU system because it would allow
Member States to identify the party responsible for that decision. Identifying a party responsible
for assessing whether self-cleaning is sufficient would add transparency to the EU exclusion system
and provide contractors with more guidance of government expectations.”).
http://publicprocurementinternational.com/2019/01/14/kings-college-london-gwu-law-school-annual-symposium-exclusion-and-debarment-18-march-2019/.
For an extended history of qualification and exclusion under the EU procurement regime, see Sope
Williams-Elegbe, supra note 3, at 38-47.
One of the central goals of U.S. acquisition reform in the 1990s was efficiency. See, e.g., Steven
Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, (2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Review 103. For recommendations on implementing efficiency, see Christopher Yukins
& Steven Schooner, Public Procurement: Focus on People, Value for Money and Systemic Integrity,
Not Protectionism (Mar. 9, 2009), in The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis:
Recommendations for the G20, Chapter 17 (Richard Baldwin & Simon Evenett, eds., A VoxEU.
org Publication), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356170. At the same time, the trajectory of
reform in the EU the approach has been shaped much more by the promotion of core Single Market
principles – competence, transparency and equal treatment, and the achievement of efficiency supported by these basic principles. See, e.g., Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 3, at 38-47 (discussing
EU approach to qualification and exclusion).
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“sealed bids” in the United States).17 The U.S. federal system includes a number
of mature and aggressive socioeconomic initiatives; procurement under the EU
procurement directives, in contrast, is only now beginning to embrace socio
economic goals, often under the rubric of “sustainability” in public procurement.18
And while the EU’s Member States make extensive use of the competition exception for “in-house” procurement (procurement by one public agency through
another, subsidiary agency),19 this issue of “in-sourced” procurement between
agencies has played a far smaller role in U.S. federal procurement.20 These types
of differences do not, however, preclude useful comparison between the U.S.
and EU approaches to exclusion and debarment; indeed, as the discussion below
shows, these differences in other quarters point up structural parallels in the
two systems and thus make it easier to see how the two systems can cooperate
in exclusion and debarment.
The analysis below proceeds in several parts. Part 1 reviews the roles of exclusion and debarment in any procurement system. Part 2 discusses why and how
exclusion and debarment occur in the U.S. federal procurement system and the
path forward for exclusion and debarment under the 2014 EU procurement
directives. In Part 3, important aspects of the U.S. system will be examined
and compared to the EU regime: a requirement for internal contractor controls
(known as “corporate compliance” in the United States), the role of a suspension
and debarment official in the U.S. federal system, and how U.S. officials may
resolve concerns regarding a contractor’s qualifications through administrative
agreements, sometimes supported by an independent monitor. As the conclusion
in Part 4 notes, many of these aspects of the U.S. system are echoed in the emerging EU regime, and the U.S. experience could be useful in improving exclusion
and debarment in the EU (and elsewhere), and in facilitating cross-border procurement in the years to come.
17

18

19

20

Compare Christopher R. Yukins, The U.S. Federal Procurement System: An Introduction, Upphand
lingsrättslig Tidskrift 2017 p. 69, p. 81-83 (citing study of Umer Chaudhry showing that multilateral competitive negotiations are used in roughly 60 per cent of federal procurements), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063559, with European Commission,
Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Measurement of
Impact of Cross-Border Penetration in Public Procurement (2017) (competitive dialogue (analogous
to U.S. competitive negotiations) used in approximately 5000 procurements versus open tendering
(analogous to U.S. sealed bidding) used in approximately 2.5 million procurements, i.e., in roughly
2 per cent of EU procurements).
See, e.g., Max V. Kidalov, Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative
Assessment, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 443 (2011).
See, e.g., European Commission, Public Procurement Reform Provides Explicit Rules on Public-Public
Cooperation (Mar. 21, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/public-procurement-reform-provides-explicit-rules-public-public-cooperation-0_en.
See, e.g., Wojciech Hartung & Katarzyna Kuzma, In-House Procurement -- How It Is Implemented
and Applied in Poland, 13 EPPPL 171 (2018).
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1

Exclusion and Debarment in Public Procurement:
Roles and Aims

At the heart of any public procurement system is the government’s obligation to
spend public funds prudently. Public procurement, if done imprudently, presents
at least kinds of risks: reputation risk (the risk that the government’s reputation
will suffer if, for example, it contracts with a disreputable vendor), performance
risk (the risk that an unqualified vendor will not perform), and fiduciary risk (the
risk that funds entrusted to a public agency will not be spent as intended).21 While
those in the private sector typically focus on performance risk, governments also
develop complex rules systems to mitigate reputational risks. Thus, for example,
while a private consumer will focus on whether a vendor will perform a contract
when assessing that vendor’s qualification, a public customer also will consider the
reputational risks that the vendor poses to the government. As a threshold matter,
therefore, two risks – performance and reputational – play vitally important roles
in how a government qualifies, or excludes, a prospective contractor.
Exclusion and debarment of vendors that pose special performance or reputational risks are thus the threshold means of protecting the public’s interest. In
the U.S. federal system, qualification and debarment promote this aim by precluding agencies from entering into new contracts with vendors, for example, that
have previously violated the law, or have failed to perform on prior contracts. In
the U.S. perspective, those prior failures suggest that the vendor lacks adequate
internal controls, and thus is nonresponsible (to use the U.S. term of art).22 At the
same time, both the data that public officials draw upon in making qualification
decisions and exclusion itself may serve as early warnings for other procurement
systems that seek to avoid these same vendors.23 As a result, exclusion and debarment for unqualified vendors serve to protect the public interest, not only in the
procuring state but also more broadly among governments and institutions that
share information regarding contractor qualification.
Given these goals, the issues that arise around exclusion and debarment in public
procurement tend to fall into several common categories. The first involves the question why vendors may be excluded or debarred. As the discussion below reflects, the
EU procurement directives and the U.S. federal procurement rules take different
approaches to this threshold question, in part because the EU, vitally concerned
with ensuring that vendors are not excluded as a result of national bias in the
21

22
23

See, e.g., Jesper Stenberg Johnsøn, The Basics of Corruption Risk Management (2015), available
at https://www.u4.no/publications/the-basics-of-corruption-risk-management-a-frameworkfor-decision-making-and- integration-into-the-project-cycles.pdf.
See Kate M. Manuel, supra note 9, at 8.
See Johannes S. Schnitzer & Christopher Yukins, Combating Corruption in Procurement: Debarment
Present and Future, in Future-Proofing Procurement 26-27 (UNOPS 2016), available at http://www.
bhrinlaw.org/documents/2015-asr-supplement.pdf.
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Member States, fosters slightly differing approaches to vendor qualification. Second,
there is the question of who should disqualify – should it be the contracting official in
charge of a specific procurement, or should a higher-level official (or agency) make
more general decisions to exclude vendors across an entire procurement system?
Third is the question of rehabilitation and controls – of the circumstances under
which a wayward vendor will be allowed to reenter a public procurement market.
As the discussion below reflects, while both the EU and the U.S. government may
allow a vendor to return to public markets if the vendor institutes internal controls
(“self-cleans,” in the EU term), the U.S. government tends to approach exclusion
not as a matter of rectifying (or “cleaning”) specific failures, but rather as part of
a broader effort to manage the risks posed by unqualified contractors.

2

Exclusion and Debarment Under the U.S. Federal
Acquisition Regulation

2.1 General Remarks
The U.S. federal procurement market is one of the largest in the world. According
to USASpending.gov, the U.S. government’s leading website on federal procurement data, the federal government spends roughly US$500 billion on contracts
every year – slightly less, for example, than the annual gross domestic products of
Sweden or Poland.24 Because the U.S. government’s procurement market is highly
attractive to vendors from all over the world, this market is competitive, but also
very demanding. It requires not only that contractors provide very high-quality
goods and services, but also that they adhere to high ethical standards. These
robust expectations for contractors are reflected in many ways, including the large
numbers of contractors and individuals suspended and debarred each year. The
coordinating committee for federal suspension and debarment officials from across
the federal agencies, the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee
(ISDC), reported that in 2017 a total of 604 contractors and individuals were
suspended (exclusion on a temporary basis, for example while an investigation
proceeds), 1613 were proposed for debarment (a process which, under U.S. rules,
normally triggers de facto debarment), and 1423 were proposed for debarment or
debarred (exclusion across all federal agencies, generally for a term of years), for a

24

https://datalab.usaspending.gov/contracts-over-time.html.
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total of 3640 actions.25 The suspending and debarring officials in the Department
of Defense were the leaders, probably because defense procurement represents by
far the largest portion of U.S. federal procurement. As noted, these suspension
and debarment decisions, though issued by a lone suspension and debarment
official in a specific agency, apply across the federal government; thus, if an
agency suspension and debarment official determines that a contractor is not
presently responsible, that decision will have government-wide effect, and may
have collateral effects if other governments, or institutions, rely on that decision.
Although the concept of contractor responsibility can be traced to the earliest days of the republic during the Revolutionary War,26 one of the first formal
recognitions of debarment came in 1928 when the U.S. Comptroller General
recognized that in some instances “the interests of the United States” may necessitate debarment 27. With the passage of the Buy American Act of 1933, Congress expressly authorized debarment based on a statutory violation for those
contractors that sold goods in violation of the Act.28 Two laws from the 1940s,
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, laid the groundwork for what in the early
1980s became the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which governs procurement
across all the agencies of the executive branch of the U.S. government. In 1982,
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued Policy Letter 82-1, which established temporary uniform guidelines for suspension and debarment.29 Two years
later, the FAR and its provisions regarding exclusion, debarment and suspension became effective.30 Since that time, many rulings clarifying the scope and
meaning of the FAR guidance on exclusion and debarment have been issued.

25

26

27

28

29

30

See The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee Report FY 2017, at 2 (2018), available at
https://www.acquisition.gov/isdc-reporting. The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee reports to Congress annually on the status of the federal suspension and debarment system,
pursuant to Section 873 of Public Law No. 110-417. Per Section 873, the reports describe the
government’s progress in improving suspension and debarment, and provide a summary of each
agency’s suspension and debarment activities for the fiscal year. Id.
See, e.g., Capt. Shawn T. Gallagher, Due Process Standards and Considerations Regarding Suspension
and Debarment, at 2-3 (Judge Advocate General’s School,1988) (discussing history), available at
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a451526.pdf.
For more general histories of the U.S. federal procurement system, see, e.g., James Nagle, A History
of Government Contracting (2d ed. 2012); Christopher R. Yukins, supra note 19.
Buy American Act of 1933, Public Law No. 428, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 212, title III, sec. 3(b),
47 Stat. 1489, 1520 (March 3, 1933), available at http://legisworks.org/congress/72/publaw-428.pdf.
The temporary debarment guidance, which was to expire in 1984 (the year the FAR took effect),
was reproduced at 41 Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix (1982).
See Joseph D. West, Timothy J. Hatch, Christyne K. Brennan & Lawrence J.C. VanDyke, Suspension and Debarment, 06-9 Briefing Papers 1, 2 (Thomson West, Aug. 2006), available at https://
www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/WestHatch-SuspensionDebarmentBriefingPaper.pdf.
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The current U.S. provisions concerning exclusion and debarment are gathered
in Part 9, Contractor Qualification, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, at
Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.31 Subpart 9.1 addresses contractor
responsibility – what it takes for a contractor to be qualified for award of a federal
contract, and how that question of contractor responsibility is to be determined
by the contracting officer – and Subpart 9.4 addresses suspension and debarment,
i.e., how those not “presently responsible” will be barred from U.S. procurement.32
Debarment in the U.S. federal system33 is generally understood as “an action
taken by a debarring official . . . to exclude a contractor” from U.S. government
contracting “for a reasonable, specified period,” typically for a period of years34;
suspension means “action taken by a suspending official . . . to disqualify a contractor temporarily” from government contracting and government-approved
subcontracting. The standards for contractor qualification (responsibility) are
similar to, but not identical with, the standards for suspension and debarment.
The differences are not surprising, for responsibility standards define which vendors can be awarded a contract, and suspension and debarment standards define
which cannot. That said, both sets of standards – responsibility and suspension/
debarment – can be read of a piece, as related guides for officials in assessing the
performance and reputational risks posed by prospective contractors. Indeed, the
Federal Acquisition Regulation itself knits together the concepts of responsibility
and suspension/debarment in FAR 9.402(a), where it notes as a matter of policy
that agencies are to award contracts only to responsible contractors, and that
debarment and suspension, as “discretionary actions . . . are appropriate means
to effectuate this policy”.
Both sets of standards are designed to protect the government’s interests from
potential harm posed by individuals or firms which present a lack of business
honesty or integrity, or have a history of seriously poor performance.35 Precisely
because the U.S. rules regarding exclusion and debarment regulation aim to
reduce the government’s reputational and performance risks, the rules in effect
encourage vendors to invest in themselves for future work with government.
Contractors know that their future awards depend upon contracting officers
31
32

33
34
35

https://www.acquisition.gov/content/part-9-contractor-qualifications.
As noted above, there is a separate rule for debarment regarding federal spending outside the procurement process, such as grants, loans, and other forms of government assistance; that rule is
known as the “Nonprocurement Common Rule” (NCR), which similarly provides for governmentwide nonprocurement suspension and debarment. There is discussion in the federal procurement community of consolidating the procurement and nonprocurement rules under a single,
uniform rule regarding suspension and debarment, which would be applicable across the federal
government. See, e.g., Robert Meunier & Trevor Nelson, supra note 5.
Definitions of terms used throughout the regulation are set forth at FAR 2.101.
See FAR 9.406-3.
The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee Report FY 2017, supra note 27, at 2; see FAR
9.402(a).
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finding them responsible at the time of award, and that their businesses can
collapse – debarment is often termed the “death penalty” for contractors – if a
suspension and debarment official finds them not “presently responsible.” Beyond
the impact in the federal procurement market, suspension or debarment may in
effect mean that a firm cannot bid in state or local procurement markets, and “a
sudden contraction of bank credit, adverse impact on the market price of listed
shares, if any, and critical uneasiness of creditors generally, to say nothing of a
‘loss of face’ in the business community”.36
Because exclusion and debarment are tools to reduce the U.S. government’s
risks in contracting, a logical corollary is that exclusion and debarment are not
meant to punish wayward contractors or individuals, for punishment bears only
an indirect relationship to the government’s risk posture. The U.S. government
leaves punishment and deterrence largely to civil and criminal measures, such as
the severe penalties imposed for contractor fraud by the U.S. False Claims Act.37
“The serious nature of debarment and suspension,” notes FAR 9.402, “requires
that these sanctions be imposed only in the public interest for the Government’s
protection and not for purposes of punishment”.38
Debarment means disqualification from federal contracting for a specified
period, typically three years for firms, but longer if there are serious circumstances.39 Although suspended or debarred contractors are excluded from receiving contracts, an agency head may for “compelling reason” override that ban.
Contractors suspended or debarred also may not conduct business with the U.S.
government as agents or representatives of other contractors.40
What is more, a party precluded from participating in federal contracts is also
excluded from receiving grants, loans, and other forms of federal assistance.41
36
37

38

39

40
41

Gonzalez v. Freeman, 344 F.2d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, The False Claims Act: A Primer (2011), available at https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.
For background on the policy issues presented by U.S. debarment, see the collected essays by
Professor Steven Schooner, U.S. Senator Susan Collins, Richard Bednar (former Army suspending
and debarring official (SDO)), Steven Shaw (then the Air Force SDO), Danielle Brian (director of
a watchdog group, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)), James McCullough and John
Pachter (senior practitioners), Professor Christopher Yukins, Jennifer Zucker (then a U.S. Army
officer) and Abram Pafford, Suspension and Debarment: Emerging Issues in Law and Policy, Public
Procurement Law Review, Vol. 13, 2004, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=509004.
See, e.g., U.S. General Services Administration, Suspension and Debarment Division, Suspension
and Debarment: Frequently Asked Questions, www.gsa.gov/about-us/organization/office-of-governmentwide-policy/office-of-acquisition-policy/gsa-acq-policy-integrity-workforce/suspension-debarment-division/suspension-debarment/frequently-asked-questions-suspension-debarment.
FAR 9.405.
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget, in the White House, has issued guidelines to agencies
on government-wide debarment and suspension in “nonprocurement” matters (such as grants), at
2 C.F.R. Part 180. As noted, see supra note 34, there is a policy initiative underway to unify these
two sets of rules, in “procurement” and “nonprocurement” matters.
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Suspensions and debarments apply governmentwide – one agency’s action precludes all executive agencies from doing business with the excluded party.42 Notwithstanding the debarment, suspension, or proposed debarment of a contractor,
agencies may continue contracts or subcontracts in existence at the time of the
action unless the agency head directs otherwise.43 Suspension and debarment
can be applied to both firms and individuals, and can be extended to a firm’s
affiliates, as well.44
Both actions – suspension and debarment – result in reputational harm to the
affected individual or firm, through listing in the System for Award Management
(www.sam.gov), a central repository of qualification and performance information
operated by the U.S. General Services Administration. Listing at sam.gov is how
those outside the government typically learn of suspensions and debarment. The
information available in the sam.gov database is used by contracting agencies
and prime contractors when evaluating prospective vendors and subcontractors,
and by financial institutions and others outside the government – and outside
the United States.
With all this in mind, it should be highlighted that suspension and debarment
are commonly seen as some of the last measures to be used by contracting agencies,
and as measures that should be used sparingly.45 Before undertaking a suspension
or debarment, an agency will often undertake other, less extreme measures, such
as the administrative agreements discussed further below.46 Agencies in the U.S.
government use suspension and debarment cautiously because they recognize that
suspension and debarment can narrow competition dramatically, and can be economically devastating to the affected contractor or individual. Because of that serious
impact and the need to ensure due process, the affected individuals and firms can
seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While that
review is generally deferential – the judge will be looking for a reasonable basis
in the record for the suspension or debarment decision – the prospects of that
review and possible reversal do make suspension and debarment officials proceed
cautiously. And those officials often proceed cautiously because they are keenly
aware that suspension and debarment, as noted, can disrupt the supply chains on
which agencies rely, and (by eliminating one or more prospective competitors) can
42

43
44
45

46

See Christopher R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
233, 233-34 (2013); see also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Suspension and Debarment:
Some Agency Programs Need Greater Attention, and Governmentwide Oversight Could Be Improved,
GAO-11-739, at 4 (Aug 31, 2011).
FAR 9.405-1; 2 C.F.R. § 180.415.
FAR 9.406-1.
For a very useful economic analysis of the costs and benefits of debarment, see Emmanuelle Auriol
& Tina Soreide, An Economic Analysis of Debarment, 50 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 36 (2017).
See, e.g., Robert T. Rhoad & David Robbins, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension – Part II: Suspension
and Debarment, 2019 Gov’t Contracts Year in Review Briefs 26 (Thomson Reuters 2019).
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radically reduce the competition available for a customer agency. A suspension and
debarment official can approach the problem as one of balancing risk: while the
government’s performance and reputational risks may weigh in favor of suspension
or debarment, the contractor may be able to present assurances that it can mitigate
those risks (through remedial compliance measures which parallel the “self-cleaning”
contemplated by the EU procurement directives), and the risks of losing a competitor and judicial reversal (for an unsupported action) may weigh in favor of other
approaches, short of suspension or debarment, such as an administrative agreement.
Because these risks and their resolution are inherently subjective and potentially
quite serious for the government, a suspension and debarment official (especially
in the larger customer agencies) is frequently a senior, respected official (and often
an attorney) with substantial experience in procurement. Furthermore, because
of the complicated nature of these proceedings, which may involve complex
misconduct, an extended investigation and layers of remedial measures, these
suspension and debarment officials (depending on the agency) may be supported
by a dedicated staff of subordinate officials, themselves often with training in
procurement and the law. The suspension and debarment officials can exercise
enormous authority, and the function is treated quite seriously in the U.S. federal
procurement community.

2.2 Grounds for Suspension and Debarment Under the FAR
While the process for discretionary debarment leaves a great deal of authority to
the suspension and debarment official, the system is not wholly discretionary, for
(similar to the EU regime under Article 57 of the directive) there are mandatory
grounds for debarment as well, typically based on violations of certain statutes.47
Discretionary suspensions and debarments – our focus here – are framed by
standards set forth in the FAR. Those standards, as noted, in many ways echo
the standards for responsibility and indeed are found in sister provisions in FAR
Part 9. Under those standards, 48 it is the debarring official’s responsibility to
determine whether debarment is in the government’s interest49. The FAR says that
agencies may – but need not of – suspend or debar a contractor when grounds
for exclusion exist, such as fraud, tax evasion, corruption, or criminal behavior,
a failure to disclose a serious violation (such as fraud or bribery), or on “any other
cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility the

47

48

49

See, e.g., Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. §§8301-8305); Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7401); WalshHealey Public Contracts Act (41 U.S.C. § 6501-6511).
By design, the grounds for discretionary suspension and debarment in the FAR are substantially
similar. Compare FAR 9.406-2 (grounds for debarment) with FAR 9.407-2 (grounds for suspension).
FAR 9.406-1. For a discussion of parallels between grounds for debarment under the FAR and the
EU procurement directives, see Sati Harutyunyan, supra note 13, at 461.
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contractor.”50 This last ground, commonly referred to as the “catch-all” provision,
affords the suspending and debarring enormous discretion, and renders the other
grounds for suspension and debarment more illustrative than exclusive.
The suspension and debarment official’s discretion is redoubled because (as
noted) he or she need not take action, if for example the contractor can remedy
the apparent performance and reputational risks.51 In practice, that broad authority not to take action, and the informal process for suspension and debarment
(discussed below), mean that some suspension and debarment officials may exert
quiet pressure on the contractor to undertake remedial measures in other quarters
– a controversial practice52 that is likelier to emerge under a broader strategy for
a “coordination of remedies” (as coordinated enforcement is known in the U.S.
Department of Defense rules)53. The officials’ broad discretion and the relatively
informal procedures discussed below also raise a risk of corruption, which helps
explain the institutional practice (discussed above) of generally appointing senior
officials to serve as suspension and debarment officials, the availability of judicial
review grounded in the administrative record, and the procedural protections
further outlined in the following section.

2.3 Procedural Aspects of U.S. Suspension and Debarment
The informality of the discretionary U.S. federal suspension and debarment process may be explained, in part, by its provenance: the process, which can exclude
a contractor from all federal procurement, apparently evolved from a contracting
officer’s largely informal responsibility determination to exclude a contractor
from a particular procurement. In both cases the contractor is being disqualified
because of perceived performance and reputational risks, and the government’s
assessment of those highly variable risks – and the government’s assessment of
whether it can tolerate those risks – lend themselves to a more informal process
with relatively unstructured exchanges with the contractor.54
50
51

52

53

54

See Kate M. Manuel supra note 9, at. 11.
For a discussion of suspension and debarment as risk mitigation tools, see, e.g., Transparency International UK, Suspension and Debarment: Strengthening Integrity in International Defence Contracting
(2015), available at http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/150507-Suspension-and-Debarment.pdf.
See, e.g., Andy Liu & W. Stanfield Johnson, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension – Part II: Suspension
and Debarment, 2014 Gov’t Contract Year in Rev. Br. 21 (Thomson Reuters 2014) (discussing
initiative to recover program funds).
See 32 C.F.R. Part 516, Appendix D, Department of Defense Directive 7050.5, Coordination of
Remedies for Fraud and Corruption Related to Procurement Activities.
See, e.g., Pascale Helen Dubois, Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud &
Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension and Debarment with the World Bank’s Sanctions System,
U. Chi. L. For., Vol. 2012, Iss. 1, Art. 10, available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/
vol2012/iss1/10.
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The U.S. suspension and debarment process advances through stages intended
to give the suspension and debarment official a sound understanding of the contractor’s misconduct and remedial efforts. The suspension and debarment official
may receive information on contractor misconduct from any number of sources,
including investigators, prosecutors, competitors and the press. While different
agencies have established very different suspension and debarment procedures
(a point of some continuing controversy55), agencies as a general matter are to
“establish procedures governing the debarment decisionmaking process that are
as informal as is practicable, consistent with principles of fundamental fairness”56 .
Those procedures are to “afford the contractor (and any specifically named affiliates) an opportunity to submit, in person, in writing, or through a representative,
information and argument in opposition to the proposed debarment”.57
The provisions at FAR Subpart 9.4 describe the steps to be followed in those
cases where suspension or debarment is not supported by the conclusive evidence
of a criminal conviction or a civil judgment (civil fraud, for example). In those
cases, the agency is give written notice of a proposed action to the contractor,
with a statement of reasons, an explanation of the agency’s procedures, and an
opportunity to respond. If the facts submitted by the contractor in opposition
to the evidence of misconduct cited by the agency raise a “genuine dispute over
facts material to the proposed debarment,” the agency is to afford “the contractor
an opportunity to appear with counsel, submit documentary evidence, present
witnesses, and confront any person the agency presents,” in a transcribed proceeding. The suspension and debarment official’s decision is to be in writing,
based on the facts as found, together with any other information submitted by
the contractor and in the administrative record. Another official may be tasked
to make findings of fact, which the suspension and debarment official may reject
“only after specifically determining them to be arbitrary and capricious or wholly
erroneous.” Suspension or debarment ultimately must be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, with findings and the effects of the action described in
a written notice to the contractor.
While the FAR provisions describing the process are not terribly precise or
prescriptive (which explains the significant variance in agency procedures), the
FAR does carefully frame the heart of the process – the decision to suspend or
debar. The factors set forth in the FAR confirm that this is indeed a risk-based
decision by the agency, which must carefully weigh the remedial measures the
contractor has taken that mitigate the performance and reputational risks that
55

56
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See, e.g., American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law, Anatomy of a Debarment
Action, at 37-38 (Annual Meeting, Aug. 2, 2018, Chicago, IL), available at https://www.cov.com/-/
media/files/corporate/publications/2018/08/suspension_and_debarment_update.pdf.
FAR 9.406-3(b)(1).
Id.
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the contractor’s misconduct raises for the government. Before arriving at any
suspension or debarment decision, the SDO should consider factors such as the
following:58
• Whether the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal control
systems in place at the time of the activity which constitutes cause for debarment, or
had adopted such procedures prior to any government investigation of the activity
cited as a cause for debarment. This factor clearly assumes that contractors will
have internal controls – corporate compliance systems – in place before any
misconduct occurs, as called for by FAR 52.203-13.
• Whether the contractor brought the activity cited as a cause for debarment to the
attention of the appropriate government agency in a timely manner. This factor
relates directly to contractors’ obligation, under a “mandatory disclosure” rule,
to report (to the contracting officer and the agency’s inspector general) if the
contractor discovers “credible evidence” of civil or criminal fraud, bribery or
gratuities, or significant overpayments by the government. This “mandatory
disclosure” obligation stems from the corporate compliance system required
by the same clause, FAR 52.203-13; if a contractor has an effective compliance system in place (goes the reasoning), misconduct will be brought to the
attention of corporate principals who should, in turn, report the most serious
matters to the government.
• Whether the contractor has fully investigated the circumstances surrounding the
cause for debarment and, if so, made the result of the investigation available to
the debarring official. This factor links back to a separate obligation under FAR
52.203-13 – an assumption that the contractor will undertake an internal investigation in cases where there are allegations of fraud or criminal misconduct,
and if the contractor finds “credible evidence” of covered conduct (e.g., fraud or
bribery), the contractor will make a mandatory disclosure to the government.
The regulators made it clear that the legal privileges that normally cover an
internal investigation of this type will be respected,59 and that disclosure can
be deferred to allow a reasonable time for the internal investigation60.
• Whether the contractor cooperated fully with Government agencies during the
investigation and any court or administrative action. This factor can be read
against the backdrop of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines, which were an early foundation for corporate compliance standards now
adopted worldwide, and ultimately for the contractor compliance requirements
58
59
60

See, e.g., FAR 9.406-1 (factors that should be considered for debarment).
73 Fed. Reg. 67064, 67077 (Nov. 12, 2008).
73 Fed. Reg. at 67073 (“credible evidence” standard implies “that the contractor will have the
opportunity to take some time for preliminary examination of the evidence to determine its credibility before deciding to disclose to the Government”).
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under FAR 52.203-13.61 The Sentencing Guidelines say that criminal sentences
for private firms can be reduced if they cooperate with government investigations, as part of a normal system of corporate controls.62
• Whether the contractor has paid or has agreed to pay all criminal, civil, and
administrative liability for the improper activity, including any investigative or
administrative costs incurred by the Government, and has made or agreed to make
full restitution. This factor, which calls for payment and restitution, reflects
the “coordination of remedies” discussed above – a coordinated enforcement
effort, to ensure that the government is compensated for its losses.63 Notably
this factor does not explicitly call for victim compensation. In contrast, Article
57 of the EU’s procurement directive does require that a contractor, excluded
because of serious misconduct, has “paid or undertaken to pay compensation
in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct,” before
that contractors will be readmitted to the EU public procurement markets.64
• Whether the contractor has taken appropriate disciplinary action against the
individuals responsible for the activity which constitutes cause for debarment.
This factor shows that these factors are, in many ways, simply a restatement
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See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: U.S. Contractor Compliance Rules Likely to
Expand, 50 Gov. Cont. ¶ 147 (Apr. 23, 2008) (discussing evolution of corporate compliance rules),
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1125068.
See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 2018, Ch. 8 – Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, at 1 (2018) (“The two factors that mitigate the ultimate punishment of an organization
are: (i) the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and (ii) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility.”), available at https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guidelines-manual/2018-chapter-8#NaN.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Paragraph 6 of Article 57, Directive 2014/24/EU, spells out the remedial measures that excluded
contractors must undertake before they can be readmitted to the covered public procurement markets:
Any economic operator that is in one of the situations referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 may provide
evidence to the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient to demonstrate its
reliability despite the existence of a relevant ground for exclusion. If such evidence is considered as
sufficient, the economic operator concerned shall not be excluded from the procurement procedure.
For this purpose, the economic operator shall prove that it has paid or undertaken to pay
compensation in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct,
clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively collaborating with the investigating authorities and taken concrete technical, organisational and personnel measures that are appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct.
The measures taken by the economic operators shall be evaluated taking into account the gravity and
particular circumstances of the criminal offence or misconduct. Where the measures are considered
to be insufficient, the economic operator shall receive a statement of the reasons for that decision.
An economic operator which has been excluded by final judgment from participating in procurement or concession award procedures shall not be entitled to make use of the possibility
provided for under this paragraph during the period of exclusion resulting from that judgment
in the Member States where the judgment is effective.
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of compliance system requirements from around the world, for rules governing compliance systems – which are largely identical worldwide -- regularly
require precisely this type of disciplinary action. 65 Indeed, Article 57 of
Directive 2014/24/EU similarly calls for “concrete . . . personnel measures
that are appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct,” as
part of the “self-cleaning” demanded of contractors that seek to rejoin public
procurement markets. 66
• Whether the contractor has implemented or agreed to implement remedial measures, including any identified by the Government. As with Article 57 of Directive
2014/24/EU, discussed above, this factor looks to the contractor’s efforts to
“self-clean” (to use the EU term) by implementing stronger remedial measures.
This factor should be read in conjunction with the first factor, above: under the
U.S. system, the contractor’s remedial measures will not be new, but instead
will likely build on (and improve upon) a prior system of controls, based upon
any lessons learned from the misconduct of the contractor’s agents. The factor
also reflects a practical reality in U.S. debarment actions: they often follow on a
protracted period of investigation and review by other enforcement authorities,
an extended process of iterative exchanges between government officials and
the contractor, during which the government officials will often provide very
direct advice on remedial measures the contractor should undertake.
• Whether the contractor has instituted or agreed to institute new or revised review
and control procedures and ethics training programs. This factor follows on the
prior one, and looks to core elements of a normal corporate compliance program: effective procedures and training.67
• Whether the contractor has had adequate time to eliminate the circumstances
within the contractor’s organization that led to the cause for debarment. While
this factor appears to favor the contractor, in fact it may be used by a suspension
and debarment official to extend a review, if it appears the contractor has not
been quick or aggressive enough in “eliminating the circumstances” – e.g.,
replacing personnel or revamping control systems – that helped cause the prior
misconduct. The factor reflects the highly engaged back-and-forth that can
occur between the contractor and the suspension and debarment official, an
important distinguishing aspect of the U.S. system.
65
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See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, FCPA Guidance,
at 56 & n. 309 (2016) (describing parallel compliance system requirements in legal regimes worldwide), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/
guide.pdf.
See supra note 61.
See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, U.S. Justice Department Issues New Corporate Compliance Guidance
(May 1, 2019) (linking to parallel compliance requirements in United States and internationally),
http://publicprocurementinternational.com/2019/05/01/u-s-justice-department-issues-new-corporate-compliance-guidance/.
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• Whether the contractor’s management recognizes and understands the seriousness
of the misconduct giving rise to the cause for debarment and has implemented
programs to prevent recurrence. In very practical terms, this is often the most
important part of the suspension and debarment process in the U.S. system: the
contractor’s senior management must convince the suspension and debarment
official that management understands the firm’s errors, and will remedy them
going forward. (Because an individual facing debarment can point to no formal
“compliance system” – the focus of the prior mitigating factors – to steer his
or her behavior, this may be the only factor that an individual can reasonably
rely on in arguing against his or her debarment.68)		
These factors set forth in the FAR are only illustrative, but they confirm important aspects of the U.S. suspension and debarment system. The factors confirm
that the U.S. system is not designed for punishment; nowhere do the factors ask
about how rank or immoral the contractor’s misconduct was, or whether that
conduct merits proportionate punishment. Instead, the factors (and the U.S.
rules in general) treat misconduct as a risk, and they assume that the contractor
– typically an established actor in a mature procurement system – can be relied
upon to mitigate that risk by making internal adjustments to its control systems
and organization. The factors also open the door to other forms of risk mitigation,
short of suspension or debarment.
Probably the most prominent alternative to suspension or debarment is an
administrative agreement. Under these agreements, a contractor and the government will agree to specific remedial measures that the contractor must undertake,
and the administrative agreement will be posted by the government online.69 As
noted, the FAR specifically contemplates that a contractor found to have engaged
in misconduct may nevertheless conclude an administrative agreement under
which the company will implement new control measures, in return for being
allowed to remain a federal contractor.70 Because an administrative agreement
leaves the government at a severe informational disadvantage – it cannot afford to
monitor the contractor on a regular, ongoing basis – the government may insist
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See generally Kara Sacilotto, One Is the Loneliest Number: A Case for Changing Suspension and Debarment Regulations to Better Address Potential Exclusion of Individual Suspension and Debarment, 47
Pub. Cont. L.J. 479 (2018), available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_contract_law/
publications/public_contract_law_jrnl/v47-n4/suspension/; Daniel E. Schoeni, Personal Debarment
for Non-Distributive Corporate Misconduct: On the Efficacy of Debarring the Individual from Government Contracts for Collective Wrongdoing, 46 Pub. Cont. L.J. 51 (2016).
See generally Jessica G. Willard, Balancing Goals: FAPIIS’s Effect on Administrative Agreements, 43
Pub. Cont. L.J. 105, 118-19 (2013).
FAR 9.406-3(e)(1) (“If the contractor enters into an administrative agreement with the Government
in order to resolve a debarment proceeding, the debarring official shall access the website (available
at https://www.cpars.gov, then select FAPIIS) and enter the requested information.”).
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that a corporate monitor be part of the administrative agreement. Although corporate monitors are controversial (in no small part because they are expensive),71
standards have been developed72 to help ensure monitors’ professionalism and
objectivity, and monitors remain an important part of resolving suspension and
debarment actions in the U.S. government73.

3

Comparative Lessons from the U.S. Suspension and
Debarment System

As was noted above, future transatlantic cooperation in public procurement will
turn in part on a shared understanding of both the U.S. and EU procurement
laws. Coordinating these legal regimes, which play such an important part in
shaping their markets, will make it easier for vendors to provide essential competition on both sides of the Atlantic. That coordination is especially important
with regard to exclusion and debarment, because the issue at the heart of those
doctrines – contractor qualification – can raise insurmountable barriers to trade
if mishandled. Conversely, because governments around the world face similar
types of reputational and performance risks, being able to share information on
contractor qualification – between loosely similar systems will make it easier
for governments on both sides of the Atlantic to control the performance and
reputational risks presented by wayward contractors.
The good news is that the grounds for contractor qualification (and conversely,
exclusion) in the U.S. and EU systems are generally very similar, as the discussion
above reflected. The challenge comes in the mechanics: as the discussion above also
showed, as an operational matter the two systems sometimes approach contractor
qualification and exclusion in starkly different ways. Fortunately, those differences
arise in part because the EU system is still filling in gaps (questions of which
official should handle exclusion, for example) which the U.S. system resolved
some time ago. By sharing lessons learned from the U.S. experience, it may be
possible to draw the two legal regimes onto parallel paths, to the benefit of both.
To that end, the discussion below reviews three key issues in suspension and
debarment, problems for which EU Member States may find solutions in lessons
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The Trump administration has cautioned Justice Department prosecutors that corporate monitors
should be used selectively, not presumptively, in resolving criminal cases. See Memorandum from
U.S. Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski, Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division
Matters (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1100366/download.
See American Bar Association, Monitors Standards, available at https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/criminal_justice/standards/MonitorsStandards/.
See generally John S. Pachter, Independent Monitors: What They Do and How to Avoid the Need for
Them, The Clause, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, at 17 (Board of Contract Appeals Bar Association, June 2014),
available at https://bcaba.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/BCABA_The-Clause_Mar-2014.pdf.
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learned in the United States. (It appears that each of these lessons could be adopted
without violating the broad framework for procurement regulation laid out by
the EU procurement directives.) First, in keeping with a broad anti-corruption
trend inside and outside the EU, EU Member States may wish to require that
all contractors establish corporate controls, not only to “self-clean” when something goes wrong, but from inception, as an integral part of their qualifications
as contractors. Second, following models from the United States (and Germany
and Hungary), EU Member States may wish to use the flexibility explicitly left
them by the EU procurement directives and “centralize” the debarment function
in senior officials. Third, Member States may wish to consider the use of administrative agreements as a means of resolving exclusion issues; it seems that this
would not contradict the EU procurement directives, but instead would allow
for formalization of the “self-cleaning” contemplated by the EU procurement
directives. Each of these options is considered below.

3.1

Requiring Contractors to Establish Controls

As was discussed above, while U.S. federal procurement rules require all covered contractors to have internal controls in place shortly after the inception of
a covered contract,74 the EU procurement directives calls for such controls – for
“self-cleaning” – only after certain corporate misconduct has occurred.75 Under
Article 57 of the Directive 2014/24/EU, when a contractor has been found to
have engaged in certain serious classes of misconduct, such as participation in
a criminal organization or corruption, the contractor is to be barred from EU
public procurement competitions unless it engages in “self-cleaning.” Article 57
of Directive 2014/24/EU defines that self-cleaning to mean “measures that are
appropriate to prevent further criminal offenses or misconduct,” and describes
precisely the very same sorts of corporate controls (such as technical, organizational and personnel measures) that would normally be required under the
U.S. procurement rules. (In fact, these are precisely the same sorts of corporate
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The federal contract clause which requires a corporate compliance system, FAR 52.203-13, is triggered when the contract is expected to exceed $5.5 million in value and the performance period is
expected to exceed 120 days, per the provision at FAR 3.1004. A contractor covered by the clause
must develop a corporate code of conduct (within 30 days), and establish a business ethics awareness
and compliance program and internal control system (within 90 days). FAR 52.203-13(b)-(c).
See paragraph 6 of Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU, quoted supra note 66; see also Hermann
Pünder, Hans-Joachim Prieß & Sue Arrowsmith, Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (Carl
Heymanns Verlag, Köln 2009); Sarah Schoenmaekers, Self-Cleaning and Leniency: Comparable
Objectives but Different Levels of Success?,13 EPPPL Rev. 3 (2018).
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controls that would be required under many nations’ laws, as corporate compliance requirements are largely the same the world over.76)
Thus, although both the EU and the U.S. regimes call for corporate controls
to address contractor misconduct, the EU procurement directives calls for them
only after misconduct emerges, which is in sharp contrast with the U.S. approach
and with general requirements under Member State law. The United Kingdom’s
Bribery Act, for example, assumes that all firms will have controls in place – not
only those that engage in misconduct -- for the Act makes such controls the only
available affirmative defense if an agent of a firm engages in bribery.77 French
law (the “Sapin II” law) similarly calls for all large French firms to put corporate
controls in place.78 Moreover, a growing number of nations worldwide now require
contractors to have compliance systems as place, as part of a broader trend toward
requiring corporate compliance systems.79
The EU procurement directives thus appears to stand apart from an emerging
international trend because it requires “self-cleaning” (corporate compliance)
measures only from those firms that have actually engaged in misconduct. The EU
procurement directives narrower approach may have resulted from an idiosyncratic
policy goal that the EU procurement directives seeks to address: the need to foster
adequate competition across the EU by re-admitting those contractors, otherwise
excluded, that engage in self-cleaning.80 That goal, grounded in competition policy
and EU integration, is divorced from the anti-corruption goals which normally
inform governments’ requirements that private firms establish internal controls.
The U.S. experience, and the experience of other nations inside and outside the
EU, suggest that EU Member States may wish to take a broader approach and call
for contractor controls from all firms, as part of an integrated effort at controlling
risk in the procurement process. Notably, the EU procurement directives appears
to leave that possibility open, for Recital 102 of Directive 2014/24/EU provides
“for the possibility that economic operators can adopt compliance measures aimed
at . . . preventing further occurrences of . . . misbehavior,” including “personnel
76
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See U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, FCPA Guidance, supra
note 62, at 56 & n. 309.
Bribery Act 2010, ch. 23, § 7, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/7;
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and organisational measures such as the . . . the implementation of reporting and
control systems, the creation of an internal audit structure to monitor compliance
and the adoption of internal liability and compensation rules.” The Court of Justice for the EU has cautioned that qualification requirements that overly narrow
competition may violate EU procurement requirements.81 But a requirement
such as the U.S. requirement – a requirement that a compliance system be put
in place only after award – would seem less likely a cause of concern, especially
since some Member States are now effectively requiring that all corporations (or
at least all large corporations) have such compliance systems in place, and the
same Recital 102 of Directive 2014/14/EU says that, with regard to self-cleaning, “it should be left to Member States to determine the exact procedural and
substantive conditions applicable in such cases”.

3.2 Establishing a Centralized Exclusion Function
Another important aspect of suspension and debarment in the U.S. government,
as noted, is its reliance on a senior official in an agency – a suspension and
debarment official -- who is responsible for assessing contractors for suspension
or debarment. (Notably, the World Bank has also made a central suspension and
debarment officer part of its sanctions system.82)
The EU procurement directives, in contrast, calls for the exclusion decision to
be made by individual contracting authorities and entities on a contract-by-contract basis. Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU provides that it is the contracting
authority that shall exclude an economic operator from participation in a procurement procedure. This may raise serious issues in practice, for contracting entities
– specifically, the contracting officials making decisions for those authorities –
may lack the experience and knowledge necessary to assess the reputational and
performance risks posed by a wayward contractor.
The U.S. approach suggests that exclusion and debarment decisions are complex and require a specially authorized, senior official. In the U.S. federal procurement system, the suspension and debarment official (SDO) serves a broader
public interest in assessing contractors for their present responsibility. The SDO
must have a keen understanding of the legal regulation concerning government
acquisition, and also must be able to discern the future reputational and performance risks that a vendor may pose. The SDO must be able to assess the
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seriousness of the contractor’s acts or omissions, in terms of both performance and
reputational risks to the government, and must be able to assess the contractor’s
remedial measures and other factors, such as the economic impact of barring
the contractor from future awards. The SDO’s authority extends to all phases
of a suspension and debarment procedure, including the gathering of evidence,
the exchanges with the affected contractor, the application of the decision, and
a possible administrative agreement.83
The EU procurement directives leaves open the possibility that Member States
will appoint a higher level official, analogous to an SDO, to oversee exclusion
and debarment. Recital 102 of Directive 2014/24/EU states that Member States
should, in particular, “be free to decide whether to allow the individual contracting
authorities to carry out the relevant assessments or to entrust other authorities on
a central or decentralised level with that task”.
In a 2018 study, the SIGMA Programme at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded, based upon a survey of best
practices across Europe, that a centralized approach was a sounder one. The
SIGMA report noted that, because (per the recital quoted above), in “implementing requirements on self-cleaning measures, Member States have the discretion to
determine the exact procedural and substantive conditions that will be applicable,”
EU Member States “are free to decide whether to allow the individual contracting
authority to carry out the relevant assessment or to entrust another authority, on a
central level (see the example of Hungary . . . ) or a decentralised level, with this
task.”84 Citing specifically to Hungary’s experience with a centralized function,
the SIGMA Programme reported:
The 2014 Directive introduced “self-cleaning” measures. Despite the existence
of one or more relevant grounds for exclusion, self-cleaning measures allow
economic operators to rehabilitate themselves on the basis of strict conditions
and take part in procurement procedures. An interesting way of transposing
this new mechanism has been chosen by Hungary, which opted for centralised
management of self-cleaning decisions. A decision-making process that is carried
out centrally enables the uniform application throughout the national procurement
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system, ensures legal protection and a higher level of legal certainty compared to
decision making at the level of an individual contracting authority.85
While the Hungarian approach is not, strictly speaking, precisely like the U.S.
approach – the U.S. system consolidates control of system-wide exclusion in
a senior debarring official, while the Hungarian approach centralizes only the
approval of self-cleaning measures which will allow excluded contractors to compete again – the practical effect is largely the same: the Hungarian system, like
the U.S. system, centralizes responsibility for admitting or excluding vendors
from a broader procurement system, at a higher administrative level than the
procuring entity.
Germany has also adopted a centralized approach to exclusion, similar to
Hungary’s. Under recently developed German rules, the German Competition
Authority (Bundeskartellamt) has the power to rule on whether firms excluded
for improper behavior have undertaken sufficient “self-cleaning”; if so, the Bundeskartellamt will enter the firms’ names in a list of approved vendors.86
Drawing on the Hungarian, German and U.S. experiences, EU Member States
may wish to vest a higher, centralized authority with the power to exclude. These
first steps to implement Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU under Hungarian
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and German law suggest that other Member States may want to assess whether,
following the U.S. model, they wish to vest a senior official – perhaps, per the
U.S. model, a senior official with intimate knowledge of the competitive landscape
and the procurement and reputational risks the government faces – to guide the
exclusion process.

3.3 Administrative Agreements and Independent Monitors
Another important tool in the U.S. suspension and debarment system is the administrative agreement; as noted, a U.S. debarring official may decide not to suspend
or debar a contractor, but instead to enter into an administrative agreement which
specifies the remedial measures the contractor commits to undertake.87 The FAR
allows for the use of administrative agreements in lieu of suspension or debarment, and requires the debarring official to publish any such agreement on the
Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS).88 The
Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee reported, for example, that
fourteen agencies entered into a total of 64 administrative agreements in 2017.89
As a practical matter in the U.S. system, if grounds for suspension or debarment have been established but the debarring official has been assured that the
entity is nonetheless presently responsible, the suspension or proposed debarment
process may be settled with an administrative agreement.90 These agreements are
viewed as “appropriate when government officials determine that the company
has made a sufficient showing of corporate responsibility and cooperation, and
that the government’s interests can be adequately safeguarded by allowing the
company to continue to do business with the government, subject to certain
conditions, including supervision and appropriate reporting.”91 Administrative
agreements allow the contractor, the government and affected stakeholders –
including employees, pensioners, shareholders and members of the public – to
avoid the potentially severe disruption of a suspension or debarment.92
Administrative agreements can vary from one matter to another, but in general
they allow contractors to reduce, suspend or avoid outright government enforcement actions, including suspension or debarment.93 Among other things, an
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administrative agreement can help sustain future competition, when a debarment
could cripple competition by eliminating a key competitor.94
In an administrative agreement, the contractor will typically admit its wrongful
conduct, and may agree to pay damages or restitution, to fire or reassign employees, to implement more rigorous compliance measures or to allow increased
auditing, or to undertake other remedial measures.95 Administrative agreements
can be concluded with both firms and individuals.96
Concluding an administrative agreement sometimes requires the appointment of an independent monitor. As an independent third party, relied upon as
the impartial “eyes and ears” of the government, the monitor should not be an
employee of the contractor or the government. If a monitor is appointed, the contractor can work collaboratively with the monitor to strengthen and improve the
company’s ethics and internal controls, and the monitor should have access to all
records and individuals. A monitor typically will assess the company’s conformance with the terms of the administrative agreement, including the effectiveness
of the company’s compliance program, and will then make recommendations
for improvement in a report to the agency.97
Although the EU procurement directives makes no direct references to administrative agreements or monitoring, Recital 102 of Directive 2014/24/EU, as noted,
does explicitly leave it to the Member States to determine how contractors should
undertake “self-cleaning”98 – precisely, it seems, the issues that would fall within
an administrative agreement and a monitoring arrangement.
Nor does Directive 2014/24/EU bar these practices, and Transparency International has long supported these types of cooperative efforts between contractors
and government agencies through “Integrity Pacts,” which have been used across
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the Continent.99 Member States, drawing on this history and the U.S. experience,
and relying on the flexibility left by the EU procurement directives, may decide to
call for the use of administrative agreements and monitoring to control residual
performance and reputational risks among contractors that previously engaged
in wrongdoing, but seek to reenter public procurement markets.

4 Conclusion
As the foregoing shows, future transatlantic coordination in procurement markets
will require a close understanding of the legal regimes on both continents. One
especially important area of coordination will involve contractor qualification,
both because of the potential barriers to trade and because of governments’ common need to share information. The main challenge in contractor qualification
– and exclusion – is to balance, on one hand, the need to contain the reputational
and performance risks that bad contractors may pose, against on the other the
deep disruption that barring a contractor may cause. To effect that balance, the
EU Member States implementing the recent EU procurement directives may
wish to look to U.S. strategies for exclusion and debarment, strategies which are
deeply grounded in a risk-based approach.
The three strategies discussed in this paper – a broader reliance on corporate
compliance among contractors, centralizing authority over the exclusion of contractors, and the use of administrative agreements and independent monitors as an
alternative to debarment – have been used reliably in the United States, and seem
to fit comfortably within the broad mandates of the EU procurement directives.
Two of the strategies – corporate controls and centralized authority over exclusions
– are already widely used in EU Member States, and administrative agreements
and independent monitors are logical extensions of the “corporate self-cleaning”
that the directives contemplate for sloppy or corrupt contractors. Adopting these
strategies would seem to follow the trajectory plotted by the directives, and would
help draw both systems, U.S. and EU, toward a common path.
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